US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0067/00671.txt

Text File | 1990-12-23 | 38KB | 579 lines

$Unique_ID{USH00671}
$Pretitle{69}
$Title{Manhattan:  The Army and the Atomic Bomb
Chapter XIII    The Raw Materials Program}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Jones, Vincent C.}
$Affiliation{US Army}
$Subject{trust
states
united
union
committee
uranium
ore
thorium
agreement
british}
$Volume{CMH Pub 11-10}
$Date{1985}
$Log{}
Book:        Manhattan:  The Army and the Atomic Bomb
Author:      Jones, Vincent C.
Affiliation: US Army
Volume:      CMH Pub 11-10
Date:        1985

Chapter XIII    The Raw Materials Program

     From the very beginning of the atomic energy project, one of the most
important activities was procurement of basic raw materials, many of them
never before in great demand.  The Office of Scientific Research and
Development had begun acquiring a number of these materials through the
planning board of its S-1 Section and through Stone and Webster, and in
mid-1942, when the project was placed under the direction of the Army, the
Manhattan District assumed responsibility for the ongoing materials program.
With the long range objective of ensuring America's control of the world's
more significant deposits of uranium and thorium, the District almost
immediately became involved in acquisition efforts at an international level.
This, project leaders felt, was critical to national security and would
prevent unfriendly nations from securing these supplies.

Geographic Search and Field Exploration

     In October 1942, shortly after General Groves became executive officer of
the Manhattan Project, Deputy District Engineer Nichols and Union Miniere
Director Edgar Sengier successfully completed negotiations for the District's
acquisition of the company's remaining stocks of mined uranium ore, stored on
Staten Island and in the Congo, thus assuring the atomic program a sufficient
supply to meet its wartime requirements.  Yet in the ensuing months, project
leaders gradually came to realize that raw materials procurement could not be
limited to meeting only the immediate wartime demands.  First, by their
decision to build and operate several large production plants, they had
established a requirement for a continuing supply of uranium, not only for the
wartime weapons program but also for postwar armaments and development of
atomic energy as a great new source of power.  Second, they became
increasingly aware of important strategic considerations as, beginning in
1943, the United States negotiated interchange agreements with Great Britain.
Both the American and British leaders concluded that the best future interest
of the two countries would be served by a joint effort to seek out and gain
control over as much of the world's uranium and thorium deposits as possible;
this policy, they reasoned, would ensure their governments ready access to
major new resources of inestimable value and would keep these resources out of
the hands of their potential enemies.  Furthermore, project leaders perceived
that, strictly from the viewpoint of national interest, it would be better for
the United States to conserve its own apparently limited domestic resources
and use whatever raw materials it could acquire from other countries instead.

     Although occupied with a myriad of other matters relating to plant
construction in early 1943, General Groves took time to develop an
organization for carrying out the project's long-range raw materials
objectives.  He presented his ideas to the Military Policy Committee at its 5
February meeting, emphasizing that he wanted to have "a competent mining
expert examine the possibility of developing in the United States a suitable
source of supply of the crucial ores."  By late March, the Manhattan commander
was discussing the possibility of engaging the Union Carbide and Carbon
Corporation, already under contract to operate the gaseous diffusion plant at
Clinton, to undertake a broad program of ore exploration for the Manhattan
Project.

     Groves's selection of Union Carbide rather than some other company, or
the Manhattan District, or another government agency was due to a number of
considerations, with the security aspect of primary importance.  Because Union
Carbide made regular foreign purchases of many uranium minerals, he felt it
was highly unlikely that the chemical firm's ore exploration activities for
the District would attract any undue attention.  Also especially attractive
was the fact that the company, because of its long experience in mineral
surveys and explorations, currently had an organized - although inactive -
subsidiary, the Union Mines Development Corporation, to administer the ore
program.  Following negotiations, Union Carbide agreed to activate Union
Mines, and on 24 May, Union Mines President J. R. Van Fleet accepted a letter
contract.  Under terms of this contract, Union Mines would carry out a
worldwide search for new sources of uranium, evaluate its findings, and make
recommendations as to the best way for the United States to explore them; the
government would pay all costs; and Union Mines would work without a fixed fee
or profit.

     For reasons of security, and to avoid duplication of administrative
overhead operation, Union Mines located its headquarters in the New York City
office building already occupied by other elements of Union Carbide.  Security
also was the main consideration in the administrative decision to set up a
separate Manhattan unit for monitoring Union Mines survey and exploration
activities, as well as to maintain liaison with District headquarters and its
major procurement office at Madison Square.  On 15 June, in rooms adjacent to
those of Union Mines, the district engineer established the Murray Hill Area
Engineers Office and, as area engineer, assigned Maj. Paul L. Guarin.

     While Major Guarin was organizing a small staff of technical experts and
clerks, Union Mines started recruiting trained personnel for its staff.  By
mid-1944, the company had assembled approximately 130 individuals, assigning
half of them to the New York office and the rest to field projects in the
United States and abroad.  To achieve its program objectives, Union Mines
organized staff functions along several lines.  The New York-based geologists,
translators, and clerks concentrated on a thorough search of available
technical literature on world mineral resources, in all languages.  Field
teams of mining engineers and geologists investigated known or suspected
sources of uranium and thorium.  A small group in New York studied ways to
improve the methods and equipment for ore exploration, and another small unit
at Union Mines headquarters oversaw research on beneficiation and
metallurgical processes that might be suitable for concentration of uranium
ores.  Making maximum use of the nearby facilities of Union Carbide.  Union
Mines was able to administer the entire ore program with a relatively small
overhead staff and at a cost of approximately $600,000 a year.

     During the period of its wartime operations, Union Mines supplied
Manhattan leaders with a variety of reports.  After studying the various
instruments and techniques for area surveying and ore testing, Union Mines
research staff compiled data on the latest or improved devices for detecting
uranium and thorium deposits and for testing ore samples.  It also examined
some sixty-five thousand volumes and, based on its findings, produced
fifty-six reports covering occurrences of uranium and thorium in about fifty
different countries, including not only enemy-controlled lands such as
Czechoslovakia and Thailand but also areas as remote as Greenland and
Madagascar.  And from the company's field exploration program, field teams
prepared a total of fifty-seven reports of investigations carried out in
thirty-six states and the territory of Alaska and about forty-five reports of
investigations conducted in some twenty foreign countries.

     Beginning in early 1944, the Murray Hill area engineer used the Union
Mines data to provide the district engineer with comprehensive lists
appraising uranium production possibilities in various countries.  A typical
list, for example, rated occurrences in the Belgian Congo as excellent; those
in the United States, Canada, and Sweden as good; those in Czechoslovakia,
Portugal, and Union of South Africa as fair; and those in Madagascar,
Australia, Brazil, and England as poor.  By 1945, the area engineer was also
including reports on thorium.  Brazil and India were rated excellent, while
the United States, Korea, Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, and Siam were
judged fair.  In this manner, the Union Mines data provided the essential
guidelines for reaching the long-range objective of the ore program.

Ore Control Agency:  Combined Development Trust

     By the summer of 1943, the American atomic project's supply requirements
for sufficient raw materials had convinced its leaders of the importance of
establishing adequate control over the world's more significant de posits of
uranium and thorium.  In its 21 August report to the President, the Military
Policy Committee advanced this idea, warning that "the major world supply [is]
in the Belgian Congo [and] not under our control in any way."  This situation,
the committee felt, did not bode well for the United States, especially in the
postwar era:  America's knowledge and technical capability to fabricate atomic
weapons would be of no avail without the raw materials to do the job.

     How to secure these raw materials became a priority issue for project
leaders, who felt one way was to gain control over the Congo supply.  During
the fall, Colonel Nichols attempted to convince Union Miniere Director Edgar
Sengier that the flooded Shinkolobwe mine should be reopened and its entire
future output sold to the United States; however, Sengier, who understood the
potential of atomic power, did not wish to make any commitments that he could
not later justify to the Belgian government as having been based upon military
requirements.

     The American failure to secure a long-term contract from Sengier for
future production of Congo ore came up for discussion at the 14 December
meeting of the Military Policy Committee.  The consensus of the committee was
that, with the Belgian government in exile in London and British commercial
interests apparently holding or having direction over nearly a third of Union
Miniere stock, Great Britain was likely to gain control of the Congo uranium.
So from the American point of view, the committee concluded, the best move
would be to secure joint control.  Consequently, on the seventeenth, the
American and British members of the Combined Policy Committee, agreed to begin
studies preparatory to recommending joint action."

     Speaking for the Military Policy Committee, General Groves recommended to
the President in February 1944 that the Belgians be "strongly encouraged" to
reopen the Shinkolobwe mine and that the United States and Great Britain take
whatever steps were necessary to ensure "joint control" of uranium in the
Congo.  The two countries also should collaborate to secure all accessible
supplies elsewhere, "not only for the period of the war, but for all time to
come."  The Top Policy Group endorsed these recommendations and, on the
fifteenth, Secretary Stimson and OSRD Director Vannevar Bush lunched with
Roosevelt and secured his approval.

     Following these recommendations, the Combined Policy Committee gave its
tentative approval to a draft plan for American-British-Canadian collaboration
on 17 February.  The committee would establish a Washington-based business
corporation, or similar agency, headed by a board of six directors (three to
be chosen by the United States, two by Great Britain, and one by Canada), and
the United States would pay half the cost of organization, Great Britain and
Canada the rest.  As directed by the committee, the new organization would
give first consideration to obtaining control of the Congo ore deposits.

     Final negotiations on this wartime agreement took place in London between
Sir John Anderson, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, and American Ambassador
John G. Winant.  This arrangement made for a somewhat ticklish situation, for
neither Secretary of State Cordell Hull nor anyone else in the Department of
State knew anything about the existence of the Manhattan Project.  In the
interest of continued secrecy, President Roosevelt took the view that
Ambassador Winant was his representative, not Secretary Hull's, and that
negotiations could be conducted through Winant without recourse to the
Department of State.  He designated Secretary Stimson to oversee the
negotiations, and instructions reached Winant over Stimson's rather than
Hull's signature.  For these delicate negotiations then, the War Department
assumed a role normally accorded to the State Department.  Although highly
irregular, the War Department continued to play this role in subsequent quests
for overseas uranium and thorium resources.

     Winant's instructions were carried by Maj. Harry S. Traynor, a highly
trusted officer on the Manhattan District staff, whom General Groves detailed
to brief and assist the ambassador.  Traynor arrived in London in mid-March,
armed with a letter from the President, a copy of the draft agreement, and
instructions to do everything in his power to assist Winant in completing the
accord as quickly as possible.  "Any delay in negotiations," wrote Roosevelt
to his ambassador, "might prejudice a successful conclusion."

     Despite this admonition for speed, nearly three months passed before the
London conferees were able to resolve the intricate problems associated with
preparing the so-called Agreement and Declaration of Trust.  Some of these
problems were legal in nature, and to aid in their solution Winant requested
the assistance of Brig. Gen. Edward C. Betts, judge advocate general of
General Eisenhower's European Theater of Operations headquarters, and
Secretary Stimson complied.  Betts, whom Winant trusted implicitly, also
enjoyed the confidence of Sir Thomas Barnes, Sir John Anderson's legal
adviser, and the two men worked well and easily with each other.

     One legal question that arose even before Traynor left for England was
raised by the President himself:  If the proposed organization was established
as a corporation, could its existence and transactions be kept a secret under
United States law?  There was general agreement that Roosevelt's concern for
security was justified, and after considerable legal study, Sir Thomas
suggested and General Betts agreed that the best solution was to make the
organization a common law trust.

     A second legal problem was whether the President had the authority to
enter into the type of agreement contemplated.  Two briefs were prepared on
this question - the first, at the direction of Secretary Stimson, by Brig.
Gen. Boykin C. Wrigtt, the Army Service Forces' International Division
director, who as a civilian had headed a New York law firm; and the second, on
General Groves's orders, by three lawyers on the Manhattan staff:  Lt. Col.
John Lansdale, Jr., Maj. William A. Consodine, and Pvt. Joseph Volpe, Jr.
Both briefs agreed that the proposed arrangement was within the power of the
President to make executive agreements without recourse to Congress, but both
also questioned the legality and practicability of establishing a corporation.
General Betts seconded these conclusions, which further supported the
recommendation that the organization be established as a trust.

     There were also other questions.  Should Canada be a signatory to the
trust agreement?  Should thorium be included with uranium as a valuable source
of fissionable material?  The question concerning Canada arose because it was
not a party to the Quebec Agreement.  The conferees decided to drop all
references to the country from the trust agreement, but Winant and Anderson
stipulated in an exchange of letters that one of the six directors of the
trust would be a Canadian.  As for thorium, because Metallurgical Laboratory
scientists in the spring of 1944 had concluded that it might eventually prove
to be the best fuel for atomic piles, the conferees in London decided to
include it with uranium in the Declaration of Trust.

     The negotiations were monitored carefully from Washington, where
Secretary Stimson, Harvey Bundy, as Stimson's special assistant for scientific
affairs, and General Groves kept in close communication with Winant.  Drafts
of the proposed trust agreement were sent back and forth between the two
capitals, and in the midst of the London talks Traynor traveled to Washington
to confer with his superiors.  This coordination, however, did not result in a
timely resolution of the discussions, which were complicated by the fact that
Ambassador Winant, Major Traynor, Sir John Anderson, and W. L. Gorell Barnes,
a representative of the British Foreign Office, simultaneously were involved
in quite lengthy negotiations with Belgian officials in London regarding an
agreement on future control and development of the rich Congo ore - the
primary reason for establishing the trust.

     It was early June before the conferees had coordinated and affirmed in
final form all aspects of the Declaration of Trust.  Prime Minister Churchill
signed first, affixing his signature on two copies of the agreement.
Forthwith, a special courier carried the documents to Washington, where, on
the thirteenth, President Roosevelt also signed them.  This trust agreement
established the Combined Development Trust which, under the general direction
of the Combined Policy Committee, would supervise the acquisition of raw
materials in "certain areas" outside of American and British territory.  The
individuals named as trustees, whom the committee approved at its next meeting
in September, were:  for the United States, Charles K. Leith, a distinguished
mining engineer, George L. Harrison, a businessman and special assistant to
Stimson who had been helping out on Manhattan problems, and General Groves;
for Great Britain, Sir Charles J. Hambro, head of the British Raw Materials
Mission, and Frank G. Lee, a British Treasury representative; and for Canada,
George C. Bateman, a deputy minister and member of the Combined Resources
Board in that country.  At the first meeting of the Trust on the fourteenth,
Groves was elected chairman and Sir Charles deputy chairman of the group.

Ore Acquisition in Foreign Areas

     For the leaders of the American atomic energy project, the much enlarged
program of exploration, control, and acquisition of radioactive ores in
foreign areas represented the logical continuation and expansion of the
ongoing ore program in the United States and Canada.  Because the deposits
would be in countries not under American or British control, they left the
problem of acquisition to the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined
Development Trust.  Operating at the international level, these joint
American-British groups were technically outside the direct control of the
Manhattan District; however, their activities inevitably were influenced
greatly and related closely to those of the American project, not only because
in the foreseeable future the latter would have the greatest need for
fissionable materials but also because two of its influential personalities
held key posts in both organizations.  General Groves, as chairman of the
Combined Development Trust, tended to dominate its activities.  And in the
Combined Policy Committee, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer headed the important
technical subcommittee, whose reports furnished much of the data for the
parent committee's decisions on matters relating to Manhattan's production and
weapons development program.

     The first important achievement for the United States and Great Britain
was final agreement with the Belgians in early fall of 1944.  As soon as the
two countries had reached agreement in June on establishment of the Trust,
General Groves and Sir Charles Hambro, acting on behalf of the Trust, began
direct negotiations with Edgar Sengier to expedite arrangements with the
African Metals Corporation for reopening Union Miniere's Shinkolobwe mine.
The diplomatic negotiations finally culminated in the Belgian, or Tripartite,
Agreement of 26 September, effected by an exchange of letters among Foreign
Minister Paul H. Spaak of Belgium, Chancellor Anderson, and Ambassador Winant.

     Under terms of the agreement, Belgium granted the United States and the
United Kingdom an option on all of its uranium and thorium resources in
recognition of the fact that "the protection of civilization" required
"effective control of said ores . . . ."  The option was to continue in effect
for the period needed to carry out ore contract arrangements set up under the
agreement, as well as for an additional ten-year period.  Belgium reserved the
right to retain such ore as might be needed for "her own scientific research
and . . . industrial purposes . . . ."

     But the two atomic partners did not secure this control over the Congo
ore deposits without making some major concessions.  President Roosevelt had
approved the concessions in August 1944, harking to the advice of Stimson, who
monitored the negotiations, that if they were not granted the Belgians might
delay indefinitely reopening the Shinkolobwe mine.  Of particular importance
was the two allies' agreement to enter into a contract between the Trust and
African Metals for purchase of 3.44 million pounds of uranium oxide under
terms acceptable to the Belgian government.  In addition, they also assented
to furnish Union Miniere with the new equipment and materials it would require
to reopen and operate the Shinkolobwe mine.  Finally, they granted the
Belgians the right to participate in any future utilization that might be made
of the Congo ores "as a source of energy for commercial purposes . . . ."

     Meantime, representatives of the Trust and African Metals, conferring in
New York, had worked out the terms of the contract to cover the procurement of
the 3.44 million pounds of uranium oxide.  On 17 October, they signed the
formal contract.  It provided that the Trust would purchase only the oxide in
the uranium ore, letting African Metals retain the radium and other precious
metals contained in the concentrate.  Reaching agreement on a fair price was
difficult, for its value had never been determined on the open market and
depended ultimately upon the success of the atomic bomb project.  They finally
settled upon a price based primarily on known cost factors - $1.45 a pound for
high-grade material, five cents less for low grade, free on shipboard at the
port of Africa (Lobito in Angola or Matadi in the Belgian Congo).  Perhaps
partly to compensate for any losses likely to result from the uncertainty as
to a fair price, the Trust agreed to reimburse Union Miniere for costs it
incurred up to $550,000 in reopening Shinkolobwe mine, and also to assist it
in procuring materials, equipment, and skilled labor.  With this assistance,
Union Miniere, which already had taken preliminary steps for resumption of
uranium mining operations in the Congo, estimated that it could begin delivery
of new oxide to the Manhattan Project by late 1945 or early 1946.

     In anticipation of the heavy financial obligations that the Trust would
have to meet under terms of the African Metals contract, as well as under
other ore acquisition contracts that it expected to negotiate in the future,
the American trustees had already taken steps to secure funds for payment of
the United States' share of the cost of Trust operations.  This had turned out
to be a fairly complex problem, because the Trust's requirement for extreme
secrecy and for continuous access to funds without time limitations to meet
contractual obligations tended to run counter to equally established
governmental fiscal procedures.  General Groves had undertaken responsibility
for coming up with a plan that would circumvent these legal barriers without
impairing the contractual capabilities or security of Trust operations.
Groves presented his plan to the Combined Policy Committee on 19 September
1944, emphasizing that the objectives of the agreement under which the Trust
had been set up in the previous June made absolutely necessary an access to
adequate funds.  The committee unanimously endorsed the plan and Groves set
about immediately to put it into effect.

     The essential feature of Groves's plan was a special fund to be deposited
with the Department of the Treasury, from which he or other designated
American members of the Trust could draw money as needed, without further
authorization being required.  Money from this fund would be placed in the
Federal Reserve Bank in New York City to cover the United States' share of
payments on Trust contracts.  On 21 September, Under Secretary of War Robert
P. Patterson directed allocation to Groves of an initial sum of $12.5 million
from funds already appropriated for national defense purposes.  By the time
Groves received the check, however, his legal staff had found that funds
deposited with the Treasury were subject to handling and processing by many
employees in both the Treasury and the General Accounting Office, too great a
security risk for the Manhattan Project.  A possible alternative was to
deposit the money directly in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York City or in
a private banking institution in that city.  But after further consultation
with War Department lawyers and with Secretary Stimson and George Harrison, a
fellow trustee, Groves concluded that probably not even this step could be
taken without first informing Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau.

     On 17 October, Groves and Harrison met with Stimson in his office to try
to resolve the Trust's quandary over its funds.  There appeared to be no legal
way around the requirement that the Trust must secure the consent of Secretary
Morgenthau before depositing the $12.5 million with the Treasury.  Yet Stimson
was convinced Morgenthau would insist on having full knowledge of the atomic
bomb project before giving his consent.  This, Stimson felt, he could not do
without permission from the President, whom he did not wish to bother
concerning such a relatively unimportant matter.  Stimson finally was
persuaded to attempt to get Morgenthau's sanction of the special fund without
telling him the reason for its existence; but, as the Secretary of War had
predicted, he refused.  Fortunately, however, further negotiations between
Manhattan District and Treasury officials revealed that Secretary Morgenthau
maintained several accounts in his office which were not subject to the usual
auditing and accounting procedures and that Trust funds might be placed in one
of them without danger of exposure.  Groves visited the Treasury Secretary on
27 October and, still without revealing the purpose, received permission to
place Trust money in one of the special accounts.  Henceforth, Groves made
withdrawals from the account, depositing them in the Bankers Trust Company of
New York to cover payments on the African Metals and other contracts.  In the
period from late 1944 until he resigned from the Trust at the end of 1947, the
Manhattan commander deposited a total of $37.5 million in the Trust's Treasury
account.

     In late 1944, the British were interested in devising a more
comprehensive plan for a long-range procurement program for raw materials.
They expressed a particular need for a study that would provide information on
developing radioactive ore sources within British areas outside of Canada.  At
its 19 September meeting, the Combined Policy Committee agreed unanimously
that the Trust should undertake a worldwide survey of current and potential
sources of radioactive materials.  Committee members also acknowledged the
need for more data on requirements, but they emphasized the theoretical nature
of scientific and technical information and the difficulty of obtaining
accurate estimates.  Nevertheless, the committee directed its technical
subcommittee to investigate and report on the uranium required for a "unit
explosive of specified energy . . ." and for the next stage in development of
atomic weapons, as well as scientific and technical factors that might have an
important effect on future ore requirements for atomic explosives.

     The technical subcommittee completed its report in mid-November; however,
after hearing a brief oral summary of its contents in January 1945, the
Combined Policy Committee laid it aside without further action.  The committee
followed a similar course with the Trust's ore survey, which Groves had sent
to Stimson on 24 November.  Although based upon more complete data from the
Murray Hill Area Engineers Office sources compiled by Union Mines and from the
British Directorate of Tube Alloys, the survey did not substantially alter the
overall picture that Union Mines had depicted in its earlier reports submitted
to the district engineer.

     As chairman of the Trust, General Groves made some specific
recommendations based on data from the Trust's ore survey.  The United States
and Great Britain should continue investigation into uranium and thorium
resources, organizing permanent survey groups in England and Canada similar to
the Union Mines teams operating in the United States; every effort should be
made to build up stockpiles in territories controlled by he two countries;
major ore deposits outside these territories (for example, uranium in the
Congo and thorium in Brazil) should be purchased and shipped for storage to
areas under control of the two atomic powers; and lesser deposits (for
example, in Portugal, Czechoslovakia, and Madagascar) should be brought under
control by purchase or by political agreements.  The United States and Great
Britain endeavored to carry out most of these recommendations.  Where
political or diplomatic negotiations were required, action was taken through
appropriate government channels.  Where commercial agreements would suffice,
the Trust initiated negotiations.

     The quest for other sources continued in 1945.  Early in the year British
officials began negotiations with the British and Portuguese owners of uranium
mining properties in Portugal, preparing the way for their purchase by the
Trust.  At the end of January, Colonel Guarin, Manhattan's raw materials
expert, returned from an extended inspection trip to the Congo with new
information on the progress being made by Union Miniere in reopening the mines
there, and as a result of his report, the Trust negotiated with African Metals
for the purchase of more Congo ores that summer.  Even the advancing Allied
Forces in Belgium, France, and Germany furnished additional small quantities
of captured uranium ore stores.

     These seized stocks became a matter of slight disagreement between the
United States and Great Britain.  The Declaration of Trust provided that all
uranium, or thorium, secured from whatever source was to be held jointly, but
it was generally understood that the first objective of the atomic program in
both countries must be to supply the American project with the raw materials
it needed to develop and build sufficient atomic weapons to win the war.
However, some British scientists felt that at least a part of the captured
ore, which had been shipped from the Continent to England for temporary
storage, ought to remain there to ensure that the British Tube Alloys project
would have adequate supplies on hand.  Groves disagreed.  When he learned in
June 1945 that ore captured in Germany was being held in Great Britain, he
wrote Secretary Stimson and asked that the Combined Policy Committee request
its prompt shipment to the United States "to increase our margin of safety of
raw material."  British committee members expressed concern that allocation of
all of the ore to the United States would leave Great Britain with virtually
no reserves at the end of the war.  The committee, nevertheless, reaffirmed
the policy that while the war lasted all raw materials received by the Trust,
including that captured, should go to the United States for weapon production.
At the same time, to placate British fears, the committee stated that if the
Trust should acquire more than needed for the manufacture of weapons, it
should hold it in reserve to be shared jointly after the war.

     Incoming mineral survey reports indicated that kolm, a coal-like material
intermixed with oil shale deposits mined in Sweden, contained uranium.  In
early 1944, a British team and a group of Swedish mineral experts concluded
that kolm's potentialities were sufficient to warrant denying other powers
access to the mineral.  At the request of the Combined Policy Committee, the
American minister in Stockholm, Herschel V. Johnson, opened negotiations with
the Swedes.  The negotiations, conducted with the knowledge of the British
minister in Stockholm, ended without a formal agreement.  The Swedish
government, however, prohibited export of uranium-bearing ores and agreed to
inform the United States and Great Britain if in the future it should decide
to permit their export.

     While the British gave full support to the program for control and
acquisition of uranium, they were much less enthusiastic about a similar
program for thorium.  On 27 January 1945, British committee member Sir Ronald
I. Campbell, who had replaced Col. John J. Llewellin, wrote to Stimson,
expressing doubt as to the wisdom of Groves's suggestion that the Trust,
without direct committee approval, should undertake measures that would likely
require political agreements and trade options.  In Sir Ronald's view, both
the Combined Policy Committee and the two governments ought to have time to
examine the implications of such negotiations before the Trust proceeded.  Sir
John Anderson advanced similar views, emphasizing that widespread occurrence
of thorium limited the possibility that the United States and Great Britain
could effectively prevent other nations from acquiring and purchasing
substantial quantities of the material.  He also suggested that, because
limited amounts of thorium were needed in the immediate future, the two allies
should rely upon the rather ample commercial production available from the
Indian state of Travancore.

     The United States, however, did not want to rely solely on British
controlled thorium supplies and in mid-February proceeded - without informing
the British government - to investigate acquisition of supplies outside of
British-American control.  In the meantime, Sir John had read Colonel Guarin's
report on the obstacles to a rapid increase in uranium ore production from the
Congo and also had learned of new information that emphasized the potential of
thorium.  Because of these developments, he agreed in early March to go along
with a more vigorous policy on thorium.  But he was overtaken by events, for
the United States was already engaged in secret unilateral negotiations with
Brazil to gain access to its thorium resources.

     Playing a significant role in laying the groundwork of these negotiations
was General Groves, who was very much aware that most atomic scientists,
including those in Germany and the Soviet Union, recognized that thorium might
soon have to replace, or supplement, scarce uranium.  When he learned
Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., would be passing through Brazil
in mid-February, en route from the Yalta Conference (3-11 February) to attend
an inter-American meeting in Mexico City, he saw an opportunity to approach
the Brazilians secretly.  Taking advantage of a conference with the President
on other matters, Groves requested and received permission to brief Stettinius
on the atomic project.  He subsequently talked with Stettinius and also
arranged to have an officer from the Manhattan staff, Maj. John E. Vance,
accompany the Secretary of State to Brazil.

     On 17 February, Stettinius conferred with President Getulio Vargas on the
question of thorium and the Brazilian chief executive approved the opening of
negotiations.  In the ensuing months, specially appointed Brazilian and
American delegations - the United States representatives included three
Manhattan officers:  Col. John Lansdale, Jr., Major Vance, and 1st Lt. Joseph
Volpe, Jr. - worked out details of an agreement, signed on 6 July 1945.  It
provided that the United States would purchase each year for three years at
least 3,000 tons of thorium-bearing monazite ore.  In addition, the United
States would have an option to buy all other thorium-bearing compounds Brazil
might produce in the initial three-year period, with the right to renew this
option for ten more successive three-year periods.  The British had no
knowledge of the agreement, but in September the United States agreed to the
understanding reached earlier in March by the Combined Policy Committee that
each country should have equal privileges in any arrangement for thorium
acquisition and control made with Brazil.

     When the committee approved the start of negotiations with Brazil, it
also endorsed taking steps to obtain control of thorium in India and in the
Netherlands East Indies.  The British began discussions with Travancore
authorities in the summer of 1945, but the negotiations proved difficult and
not until 1947 was a less than satisfactory agreement reached.  Negotiations
conducted at the same time with the Dutch concerning the East Indian sources
were more successful, and in August 1945 an agreement granted thorium
purchase options to the United States and Great Britain.